This paper explores the link between information flows and governance or institutional quality. Economic theory expounds on the importance of information on economic outcomes either through its direct effect on prices and quantities or through its effect on other factors such as institutions and the quality of governance. This paper shows that countries with better information flows also govern better. The indicators used to assess better information flows are of two kinds. One index is based on the existence of freedom of information laws. A second index is constructed called the "transparency" index which measures the frequency with which economic data are published in countries around the world. Empirical analysis shows that countries which have better information flows as measured by both indicators have better quality governance.
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This paper explores the link between information flows and governance or institutional quality. Economic theory expounds on the importance of information on economic outcomes either through its direct effect on prices and quantities or through its effect on other factors such as institutions and the quality of governance. This paper shows that countries with better information flows also govern better. The indicators used to assess better information flows are of two kinds. One index is based on the existence of freedom of information laws. A second index is constructed called the "transparency" index which measures the frequency with which economic data are published in countries around the world. Empirical analysis shows that countries which have better information flows as measured by both indicators have better quality governance. Information is a critical ingredient in efficient, well-functioning markets, both economic and political. More information allows better analysis, and better monitoring and evaluation of events which are significant for people's economic and social well-being. It allows economic and political decision-makers to evaluate opportunities and manage risks better. It allows for the possibility that decisions in economic and political markets will enhance social welfare. The importance of information in markets for different types of goods and services has long been recognised in theory (Ackerlof, 1970 , Stigler, 1961 , Stiglitz with Rothschild,1976 , Stiglitz with Grossman, 1980 , Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981 , Braverman and Stiglitz, 1986 , Stiglitz, 1984 , 1987a , 1987b , 1987c , 1989 . Modern macroeconomics as well as microeconomics and finance are based on theories of how expectations are formed using the information available to decision-makers and how these expectations translate into actions which affect future outcomes. These theories focus not only on how much information there is but also on how people use that information. A plethora of authors have investigated the effects of information on stock markets and on bank loans and interest rates. In the aftermath of the recent financial crises around the world several empirical papers have looked at how information might be used to predict crises and/or adapt policy to prevent crises (Wirjanto, 1989 , Chote ed.,1998 , and Chowdhry and Goyal, 2000 . Pagano (1993 and , Galindo and Miller (2001) , Faukenheim & Powell (forthcoming) , and Barron & Staten (2003) are among those that consider how information provided by credit rating agencies/bureaus affects how markets function.
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More recently, papers have looked at the empirical evidence linking the responsiveness of governments as well as private actors to better information provided by the media (Islam 2002 , World Bank, 2002 . For example, Burgess (2001, 2002) find that regions in India where the media are more active are also regions which are the least likely to suffer from famines during droughts. This is because regions where the media have a greater reach are also the areas where voters are more informed about political choices and able to cast votes accordingly. Political leaders knowing that their performance can be monitored and may affect re-election possibilities are more accountable to voters. Dyck and Zingales (2002) , find that a more active media as proxied by a media which has a greater circulation can be a powerful influence on the corporate governance environment. The media provides information that affects the reputation of corporate managers and thus their incentives to behave in a certain manner. Shiller (2002) and Herman (2002) discuss how media influence may in fact distort economic reality or provide a biased version of the "truth".
There is a tremendous range of information that is potentially valuable in making economic decisions: to give some examples, it can range from simple price information, to the disclosure of government processes and laws, to disclosure of private company accounts.
Information is thought to be critical in affecting how a country is governed and how accountable private business is to its customers and shareholders. Yet what information is produced, disseminated, and analysed depends on the incentives of public and private agents to do so. Stiglitz (2002) discusses the incentives of governments to restrict the flow of information.
Governments play a critical role since they can restrict or facilitate information flow. Many of the institutions (laws, regulations, organs of the state) that governments design are created to manage the flow of information in an economy. For much of the information relevant to decision-makers in political and economic markets, government is in fact the sole repository (and producer). Djankov et. al (2001) demonstrate that who provides information has a strong influence on what information is transmitted. They show that media ownership affects economic and political outcomes by influencing the nature of the information transmitted. Specifically, they focus on the issue of state ownership of the media and the impact on social and economic outcomes. Private business owners will produce, analyse and disseminate information if it is profitable to do so, or if it enables them to influence public opinion in a way that increases their non financial gains, such as social stature. Demetz and Lehn (1985, 1988) hypothesize that this effect which they call the "amenity potential" is quite high. Grossman and Hart (1988) refer to the non-financial benefits as the "private benefits of control".
What about those that demand information? Consumers and citizens will only demand information if it is perceived as useful and will only pay for it if they cannot get it otherwise. This paper extends the empirical work on information and economic and political markets. It examines how the availability of information may affect governance. Specifically, it looks at (a) how the availability of basic economic data affects governance and (b) how the legal framework governing access to information might affect the quality of governance. I ask, is better knowledge about economic performance in terms of the timely availability of economic data associated with better economic and political outcomes? Second, I examine how restrictions on the use of information can affect the quality of governance. In particular, how restrictions on the media may affect information flows and therefore governance. Mass media provide consumers and producers with information that they use to make decisions in economic and political markets. The specific restriction I consider is the presence of a Freedom of Information Act or Law (FOIA). FOIs determine the modalities by which citizens or private bodies can obtain information which resides with public entities.
It is clear how economic data helps economic markets function better. Investors, consumers and producers can make better business decisions by better assessing market conditions for their products. For example, price and inflation data help determine consumers' expenditure patterns both between products and over time. Why might we expect a greater availability of economic data to be associated with better quality government? For a number of reasons more widely available data can help governments govern better. For one, the public can judge their governments' ability to make sound policy by looking at such data. The ability to judge leaders according to how they perform in the economic sphere can affect the level of support the government has and determines how long they stay in power. In countries where different constituents are able to gauge economic performance, and where citizens are well informed, people are more likely to demand governments that govern better and governments have more of an incentive to do well. That is governments become more accountable to their people. Even in non-democratic countries policymakers may feel bound to produce better economic policy because they are monitored more effectively and they care about their reputations. They will be more wary of making large mistakes.
Second, data can help better coordination between members of government. For example, the budgetary process can benefit from data on outcomes related to fiscal expenditures. Third, the use of data to design policy can improve policymaking, help identify goals and evaluate alternative policies; and it can help policymakers to understand the relative magnitudes of the issues for which they may have had only a qualitative feel. A better understanding of the effects of policies can lead to a change in the nature of the policies adopted. For these reasons, the provision of timely and good quality economic data can improve governance.
Countries which produce economic data on a timely basis and promote their dissemination are also likely to be countries which support better information flows all around.
In other words, economic data can be thought of as a proxy for other kinds of data. It is of course an imperfect proxy since experience clearly shows that governments may on occasion divulge economic data but not political data.
Aside from access to regular economic data people need information on a variety of issues related to public sector activity. They need timely information on decisions related to various aspects of government activity, on how these decisions will be implemented, information on the consequences of these decisions and the process through which they are reached. Yet in many countries access to this type of information is very limited either because of the laws or regulations which restrict access, or simply because the administrative capacity to organize and disseminate information does not exist. Laws facilitating access to information held by the public sector can play an important role in increasing information flow and facilitating the monitoring government. This paper examines how the presence of Freedom of Information (FOI) laws may affect how countries govern. Of course, the extent to which better information will affect choices of course depends on how people can act upon their choices-many other laws affect this ability (e.g. insult and defamation laws). I focus on only one of the several possible relevant laws.
Data
The Transparency Index
In order to investigate the relevance of widely available economic data for the quality of governance, I created an index which I call the "transparency" index. For each of these variables, I determined the "desirable" frequency level. This level was determined by observing the actual frequency level with which the data are published in most of the industrialized/high income countries and taking the most frequent level as being something that is both achievable and desirable. A "Q" indicates that the data is expected to be available on a quarterly basis, the "M" indicates its availability on a monthly basis and a "Y" its availability on a yearly basis. In other words GDP numbers can be and are produced on a quarterly basis in some, mostly richer countries. These countries are assigned the highest score (or a 1) in terms of "transparency" with respect to GDP as long as they are also available on a timely basis. As For a couple of countries the coding was not followed exactly. Two countries got a better score for having higher than "desirable" reporting frequency though their scores would have been lower since the lag in data was longer than the optimum or desired lag. Armenia has GDP figures up to October 2001 and Luxembourg has FDI data up to April 2001; both are of monthly frequency. The former could only score a "2" and the latter a "3", by considering the lags. But they receive "1" and "2", respectively, since the data are available at a higher than "desired" frequency. 7 Note that for some of the countries the index was prepared looking at end-June publications. The index was then broadened to cover 40 more countries, but the end-date for these is November. This discrepancy has not made much of a difference since countries that tend not to report on a timely basis would have the same tendency whether one looks at their numbers in June or in November. 8 For these two countries the cut-off point was June; they were in the first group investigated. In addition, when coding information from a web site of the Central Bank and/or the statistics agency, in cases where there were no actual statistics on the site but it was indicated that the relevant data were available in a publication, the country received a score that reflected the most recently published issue of the printed publication. E.g. for the end-June cut-off date, if the web site indicated that there was a report containing the data published in April, then the country received a 1 for that data. If the last issue available was that of January 2002, the score was a 2 and so on. These decisions were particularly relevant for statistical information published by the national statistics agencies in several middle income or rich countries, especially Brazil, Cyprus, Greece and Germany.
In cases where the web site was inaccessible after two attempts, the information was considered as NOT being available from this source. Countries affected include Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Benin. The code for each data type is then added together to create an index of transparency in economic activities and they are averaged. The best score for "transparency" is thus 1, and the worst possible is 6 (if a country scores 6 on all 11 indicators).
It is important to note two things: even if the internet site is accessible, many individuals with interest in the data may not have easy access or any access to the internet. In cases where there are national publications, interested people may not be able to purchase it in a bookstore or the cost may be exorbitantly high. A mitigating factor may be that as long as some key individuals or organizations (such as researchers, and the media) have access to this information, there is some chance that others who are interested in key variables will be able to obtain the necessary information. Despite this fact, the measure of availability used in this paper almost surely overstates how much information on common economic data is easily available in practice.
The index, thus constructed is used to assess the importance of information/transparency on institutional quality or governance. It is likely that countries that produce timely data on these indicators are more likely, on average, to produce more timely economic data of other kinds.
The transparency index indicates how much information governments are willing to disclose -but the FOI law gives access to more than just economic data.
A) Access to Information Index
Even when governments publish simple economic data, the people they govern may not Regulations and laws governing access to information and the ability of people to disseminate information freely may be covered in other related laws as well. Press and media laws may determine how much information is circulated. Restrictive practices such as requiring journalists or newspapers to be licensed by the state may limit the flow of information, either by restricting entry or by inducing media personnel to censor information dissemination for fear of reprisal from government. These restrictions also vary in kind and scope between countries. In
Austria there is no requirement on journalists or newspapers to be licensed. 10 In the Czech
Republic journalists are not required to be licensed or accredited but newspapers are required to be licensed. However, an amended Press Law in 1990 has changed the former licensing requirements of any publishing activity into a simple registration. All periodical press is registered with the Ministry of Culture. 14 The purpose of all such laws is to define a framework for the sharing of information.
Sometimes just the act of adopting a law can signify a reduction in the restrictions imposed on information flow. Sometimes the adoption of a law can make people more aware of the value of information (Chongkittavorn, 2002) . Such laws are one important element in the whole institutional environment affecting information flow.
Adopting a FOI is clearly not enough to ensure that it is effective. Government agencies must be required to publish information and there must be some implementating mechanism for the FOI. For example, in some countries a central commission is charged with ensuring that information gets out to the public as in the case of the Information Commission in Ireland, the
Data Protection Inspectorate in Estonia and the Office of the Official Information Board in
Thailand, 15 while in Georgia, Bulgaria and Finland this is not the case. Countries vary greatly in the time it takes to satisfy requests for information. In Estonia, Hong Kong, China, and Hungary, the laws specify that responses to requests must be made before or by the 15th day. In South Africa, the limit specified is 30 days and in Thailand the limit is not specified though it must be within a "reasonable period".
In case requests for information are denied, in most cases, the nature of the appeals process is also specified. Generally, the courts are responsible for oversight: Not only are FOI laws a relatively recent phenomenon on the scene (see Table 2 ) with only 50 countries having adopted one as of May 2002 and 54 as of end 2002, but many countries are still trying to work out how to implement them effectively. Precisely because the adoption of such laws is relatively recent, it some countries it might be difficult to argue that they have had a substantial effect on governance. Yet, even in these cases it might be argued that adoption of a FOI act may be taken as one of the acts a government takes in an ongoing process to improve transparency: it is rarely the first act. Thus the existence of an act may be an indicator for a general move towards ensuring greater access to information. How long a country has been in existence as an independent nation can be expected to have an effect on institutional quality since institutions develop slowly over time. This variable is also Table 3 shows the transparency index for selected countries. Aggregating and averaging the transparency indicator among countries of different income levels shows that rich countries are more than twice as "transparent" (Table 4) . What is interesting though is that some high income countries, half of which are oil producers, have very low transparency ratings. These are the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, New Caledonia, Brunei, the Bahamas, and Slovenia.
The variation among high income countries is the highest among the three groups. For the low income countries not only is the average transparency lower but the variation between countries is also smaller. can be "free" without the FOI, and second the press can be free but not have access to reliable information. Moreover, the FOI act has relevance for other actors beside the press: business interests for example. The correlation between transparency and other freedom of media (information) variables are quite high and significant as might be expected. Djankov et al (2001) have shown that in countries where state ownership of the media is high, the press is less free. The transparency indicator constructed in this paper is significantly correlated with variables that have been used in the literature to indicate how freely information flows in an economy, particularly information provided by the media. Table 6 below shows that countries in which transparency is lower, freedom of the press is lower, state ownership of the press also tends to be higher, there is less chance of finding a freedom of information law and television also tends to be dominated by government. Table 9 shows the significance of the index after controlling for legal origin. Using table 9 as the standard set of regressions, several variations are run by adding different variables one at a time to check for the stability of the significance of the transparency index. The index remains significant for most of the indicators above and often at the 1% level for all these permutations. 
Controlling for various regional dummies (such as Africa, the Middle East and North
Africa, East Asia, South Asia or Eastern Europe) does not alter these results significantly.
Adding years since independence as an additional variable in the specifications (does reduce the significance of the transparency index somewhat in some of the cases but generally the results stay the same: the transparency index is significantly correlated with governance indicators.
Others have found that state ownership of the media is associated with poorer economic and social outcomes. I use an index developed by Djankov et al (2001) and World Bank (2002), to see whether the transparency index is still significant once this index is added (not shown).
However, the data on ownership of the media is only available for a much smaller sample. I find that addition of state ownership of the media to the right hand side of the regressions reduces the impact of the transparency index in some of the regressions (some of the versions using the KKZ indicators) but the general conclusions are still valid. That is, even in countries where much of information packaging and dissemination to the general public is controlled by government, a government that publishes more economic information governs better on average.
The transparency index is significant at the 10% level even after controlling for newspaper circulation, freedom of the press and the presence of a Freedom of Information law (see Tables 10a-10f ). .01*** (3.59)
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.02*** (2.68)
.02*** (3.8)
. Under the assumption that more information has greater value in democratic rather than autocratic governance regimes, an indicator for autocracy was added to the right hand side of the regressions. The inclusion of the indicators affects some of the variables; more information in more autocratic environments is less useful than in more democratic environments. However, the effect still significant at the 5 and 10 percent levels for several of the governance indicators.
These relationships do not prove one way causality since it may also be that governments that govern well have over time also been more likely to publish data. However, combined with the observation that information gives power to monitor and make good choices a significant and positive correlation between transparency and improved governance gives us pause to think: just giving better data to people can help countries do better. 
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. Controlling for legal origin shows that the presence of a FOI law is correlated with good governance through mostly three measures in the KKZ: voice and accountability, and regulatory burden and sometimes with graft and government effectiveness as well (see Tables 14a-b) . .42*** (5.39)
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. Economic theory tells us that information is needed to make sound economic and political choices, to monitor agents and reward or punish accordingly. Better availability of economic data and the ability of people to demand and receive the information they need is highly correlated with governance. Governments that do not produce, organize and share information will be hampered in policymaking. Good policymaking requires up-to-date information on the economic situation; good policymaking requires the sharing of information for better coordination, analysis and monitoring.
These two sets of investigations have demonstrated that information flows as proxied by the two indices, the transparency index and the access to information index, are positively correlated with the quality of governance. Better governance has been empirically demonstrated to be correlated with higher growth. Extrapolating, there is a close relationship between better information flows and how fast economies grow.
Better decision-making in economic and political markets boosts growth. We also know that many different policy choices and institutional features affect information flows.
Governments can choose to publish data and other information on their activities and they can choose whether or not to establish the regulatory system and organizational structure that allows production and dissemination of data and access to information. Thus, in the policy guidance that development advisors seek to impart, advising countries on the importance of processing and sharing data, on making this data widely available is policy advice that can boost economic growth. This paper has not demonstrated causality from more transparency to better institutional flows. It is likely that better governments are also more likely to promote more transparency. Yet it does give us some food for thought.
More research is definitely needed to take a closer look at the relationship between transparency and governance or information and economic growth. This paper provides a simple way to quantitatively assess whether the magnitude of the association is significant and worth another look.
The indicators used in the paper could be developed further. For example, the transparency indicator could be strengthened by considering not just the frequency and availability of data but also the quality of the data produced by governments. Moreover, my definition of "availability" probably overestimates the actual availability of data in developing countries and could be fine-tuned. Expanding the data set (e.g. to look at social indicators) would also be another direction in which the indicator could be developed. The FOI indicator could be substantially strengthened by considering how these laws are actually implemented, if at all, in countries. Another issue would be whether people are allowed to use the information they obtain: for example are newspaper journalists able to print information they obtain without fear of imprisonment -harsh libel and defamation laws would affect journalists' behaviour. Looking at other restrictions, such as licensing of the media to prevent entry-would also enrich the analysis.
